Why does this onion choice supposedly make Tor more secure? If a Tor
relay point can be compromised, cannot an onion relay also? Does not
this onion double the work of having to keep check on two types of
relays instead of only the Tor relay network?
I don't understand the necessity of this onion thing.
Why does this onion choice supposedly make Tor more secure? If a Tor
relay point can be compromised, cannot an onion relay also? Does not
this onion double the work of having to keep check on two types of
relays instead of only the Tor relay network?
I don't understand the necessity of this onion thing.
OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor PreviousTopNexthttps://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortorconfig.htm
Tor is a real-time onion-routing system, which thereby allows anonymous >Internet communication without any delay. That makes it useful to hide
your identity especially while surfing the web or using other services,
that aren't available by mail. But the lack of latency on the other
hand substantially increases the chances for an adversary. So for
anonymous mailing setting up a free email account through Tor is only
the second best solution.
Nevertheless OmniMix enables you to benefit from Tor with various kinds
of communication, which require immediate response, e.g. the retrieval
of remailer statistics or a stealthy Mixmaster packet delivery to entry >remailers. The program is preconfigured to run its own Tor instance and
use that for every Internet connection it establishes. You have to read
the 'Configuration' chapter only when problems arise or in case you're >interested in what's going on 'under the hood'.
But there are further services provided by OmniMix based on Tor, which
you can read about in the 'TorPlus' chapter. .../omom/tutortorplus.htm >Configuration
OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor * Configuration PreviousTopNext[end quote]
In order to hide your communication with the Mixmaster network, OmniMix
has to bypass your ISP's mail server and connect directly to the entry >remailer via the Tor network. Provided that Tor is installed on your
system and running, activate the routing through Tor for the specific
task by specifying the SOCKS protocol, which OmniMix has to use for the >communication with Tor.
E.g. to access the 'Anon Mail Host' by selecting SOCKS version 4, you
have to enter the IP address of the remailer into the 'Host' field of
the 'Anon Mail S(MTP)' tab, version 4a requires the host name, whereas
with version 5 you have the choice. To access a hidden service, enter
its name (ending with '.onion') as the remailer's host name. Since in
this case Tor has to resolve a name, the protocol alternatives are only
SOCKS version 4a and 5.
Like Vidalia, the controller software that comes with Tor, OmniMix is
capable of interacting with Tor in many ways, launching, remote
controlling and shutting down the Tor instance it uses. That's what the >options under the 'Tor' tab are designated for.
There's always a risk that the Tor connections of different
simultaneous tasks use the same routing up to the exit node, which may
allow an adversary sitting there to figure out relations. Therefore,
even if you already use Tor with your webbrowser, it's advisable to
separate communication by running another instance for exclusive access
by OmniMix, which is easy to achieve:
At the 'Run' tab set the paths to Tor ('tor.exe') and its configuration
file ('torrc'). With a 'Start' button click OmniMix launches that Tor >executable and, with 'Autoconnect' at the 'Control' tab activated, >establishes a connection with its control port. After clicking
'Shutdown' OmniMix orders Tor to shut down, then closes the control
port connection. To start and stop Tor automatically in conjunction
with OmniMix itself activate 'Autostart' and 'Autoclose'.
At least for your first experiments it can be wise to check the 'Tor
Window' box, which opens a command window when starting Tor, showing
the logged data and allowing to terminate the program by closing this
window instead of having to end the 'tor.exe' process from within the
Windows Task Manager. Finally when Tor runs and connects correctly
uncheck the box to get rid of that window.
With 'Check DNS' it's possible to recognize unsecure domain name
resolutions, as it makes Tor generate a notice-level event for each >connection to the SOCKS port, indicating whether the request uses a
domain name or an IP address. Thereby it allows to detect the
revelation of communication targets via unsecured DNS requests. If
Tor gets an IP address it may have been resolved with a direct DNS
server access bypassing the Tor gateway, which means that your target
address has become public.
A message like the following appearing in the Tor log therefore
indicates, that everything is all right:
17:01:25.062 650 NOTICE Your application (using socks5 to port 25)
instructed Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if necessary.
This is good.
This option only takes effect with Tor instances newly launched by
OmniMix.
When Tor is started and a control port connection established the
color of both Tor activity scales in the indicator field change from
grey to yellow. If that doesn't happen first check whether a new
'tor.exe' entry shows up in the Processes list of the Windows Task
Manager. Furthermore look whether the paths to Tor and its
configuration file are set correctly and whether SOCKS and control
port through which Tor tries to communicate are available and not
already occupied by another application.
Setting 'Host', the address of the Tor instance, and 'Port', its
SOCKS port, at the 'Config' tab is mandatory to allow OmniMix to
route external connections with servers on the Internet through
Tor's anonymizing SOCKS proxy service. The Tor SOCKS port number of
the OmniMix system defaults to 9054, as 9050 and 9150 are usually
occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor Browser. Shut
down Tor before changing the port number.
Using the 'Host' location from the 'Config' tab, the 'Port'
parameter at the 'Control' tab is required to connect with Tor's
control port in order to send commands and retrieve status data,
which then are displayed at the 'Tor' list. The Tor control port
number of the OmniMix system defaults to 9055, as 9051 and 9151 are
usually occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor
Browser. Shut down Tor before changing the port number.
To protect Tor's control port from unauthorized access there are
two authentication methods, both supported by OmniMix. Switching
between them requires editing the 'torrc' configuration file
manually.
If you intend to control Tor from different computers, 'Password' >authentication would be the right choice. At the 'ConTor' tab
select 'Password' authentication and enter your password, e.g.
'my_password'. Be aware, that leading and trailing spaces are
relevant! Then at the command prompt within the Tor directory
calculate the hash value for the chosen password with the command >g:\Programs\OmniMix\tor>tor --hash-password my_password
Oct 06 22:36:45.707 [notice] Tor v0.1.1.23. This is experimental
software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity. >16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
Finally, to enable Tor to check, whether the sent password is
correct, add the 'HashedControlPassword' option with the
resulting hash code to the 'torrc' file
HashedControlPassword >16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
The alternative to a constant password would be the 'Cookie'
authentication method, where at each launch Tor generates a file
named 'control_auth_cookie' anew within its data directory
containing 32 random bytes. Those bytes then have to be read by
the controller application in order to use them for
authentication. That's why apart from the activation of that
method by adding
CookieAuthentication 1
to the 'torrc' file, the location of this file has to be set by
means of the 'Cookie' file selector.
Cookie authentication, which usually is limited to local
controllers, as it requires access to a file in Tor's data
folder, is the default method when using the OmniMix system's
Tor instance.
There are further torrc parameters relevant for anonymity
reasons:
*MaxCircuitDirtiness defines for how long (in seconds) Tor
continues reusing a circuit for new
connections.
'MaxCircuitDirtiness 0' makes Tor set
up a new route for every connection
request.
*NewCircuitPeriod determines how often (in seconds) Tor
retries making new circuits if current
ones are dirty, which means already used.
At the 'Command' tab you find all instruments to influence a running
Tor instance, but for sending commands a connection to the control
port of the respective Tor instance has to be established.
At the 'Events' list select the data you want to be logged at the 'Tor'
tab. If you're connected press 'Set' to transfer the new settings to
Tor. With 'Off' no more data are listed. That's advisable in particular
for the period you request certain data from Tor by selecting an item
from the dropdown list and pressing the 'Info' button. Otherwise you'd
get a mixture of Tor events and the specific data you requested.
Once connected
*Info requests the information specified by the pulldown menu
adjacent to it.
*NewNym initiates the switch to a clean server circuit. This is a
secure way to use separate Tor circuits for different jobs
that are done one after another.
The available 'Info' data are
*Version The version of the server's software, including the
name of the software.
*Config location The path to Tor's configuration file 'torrc' on your
disc.
*Network Status A short space-separated listing of all router
identities.
*Known Routers A detailed listing of all routers known to Tor and
their characteristics.
*IP Address The best guess at our external IP address.
*Circuit Status Information about the circuits built.
*Stream Status Information about the stream status.
*Connection Status Information about the onion routing connection
status.
*Entry Guards Listing of the currently chosen entry guards.
A smart way to access the OmniMix system at home from throughout the
Internet are Tor Hidden Services. You don't have to know the server's
IP address and the communication is completely hidden and end-to-end >encrypted, as it never leaves the Tor network.
The 'Hidden' tab allows to attach four local server ports, which don't >necessarily have to be offered by OmniMix, to the Tor network, making
them available from the Internet.
For each of the local services you intend to offer you just have to
check the 'Active' box, enter the port number under which it has to be >accessed from the Internet at 'Port Ext', the local IP address of your >service at 'Address Int' and its local port number at 'Port Int'. To
install the Hidden Service Tor finally has to be restarted. It now >initializes the Hidden Service by creating an encryption key associated
with a random .onion address, the future address of your Hidden Service. >These credentials are stored in the files 'hostname' and 'private_key', >located in the folder defined in the 'Hidden Svc Dir' field. You may
backup them in a safe place.
Instead of reading your Hidden Service's .onion address directly from
the 'hostname' file you can also get it from the 'Data' tab. With a
click on 'Update' OmniMix not only requests the Hidden Service's address, >which you can copy to the clipboard by using the '*' button. It also
tries to retrieve Tor's current SOCKS and control port number as well as,
if available, the WAN IP address of Tor's host computer. By the way, the >latter offers OmniMix a great opportunity to replace external DDNS
services, which is explained in the 'TorIP' chapter.
If you want to change the .onion address because you don't like the
randomly created term, or you need a new one for a different task, press
the '-' button next to the 'HS Address' field and restart Tor. But keep
in mind, only backing up the files 'hostname' and 'private_key' from the >Hidden Service directory before they are removed with a reset allows you
to reactivate the old address some day.
On 7/10/24 18:29, karl@bogus.net wrote:
Why does this onion choice supposedly make Tor more secure? If a Tor
relay point can be compromised, cannot an onion relay also? Does not
this onion double the work of having to keep check on two types of
relays instead of only the Tor relay network?
I don't understand the necessity of this onion thing.
It's a user's choice whether they want to inject their remailer message
into the remailer network via a Tor hidden service like Mixmin's
3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
or whether they want to inject it directly via the SMTP server of the
entry remailer, say fleegle.mixmin.net:25
The former method hides your IP address from the the entry remailer.
The later method reveals your IP address to the entry remailer.
--
SEC3
YAMN Help Tutorial - https://www.sec3.net/yamnhelp/
On 7/10/24 18:29, karl@bogus.net wrote:
Why does this onion choice supposedly make Tor more secure? If a Tor
relay point can be compromised, cannot an onion relay also? Does not
this onion double the work of having to keep check on two types of
relays instead of only the Tor relay network?
I don't understand the necessity of this onion thing.
It's a user's choice whether they want to inject their remailer message
into the remailer network via a Tor hidden service like Mixmin's
3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
or whether they want to inject it directly via the SMTP server of the
entry remailer, say fleegle.mixmin.net:25
The former method hides your IP address from the the entry remailer.
The later method reveals your IP address to the entry remailer.
On Thu, 11 Jul 2024 08:13:58 +0100, you wrote:
Tor always hides the client's IP address.
That's what I thought I had read years ago. I cannot find any
reference to this question these days. It disturbs me that you say
SEC3 is mistaken. That person KNOWS what they are talking
about...confusing.
I joined the Tor forum to get the question answered by some 'expert'.
That web site is horrible concoction of everything some jackass
techie thought he had to put into one page. It is a MESS. If I get an
answer to the question, I'll post it here - if I get an answer. From
what I went through trying to sign up and then post, I have little
hope for that site. I can't believe what a mess it is. (Don't bother >telling me how great and informative it is. I ain't going to answer
any trolls.)
On 7/12/2024 3:11 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
Flawed question indicating that you know nothing about either and
can't resolve the use thereof.
The OP did a good job explaining it to you. It's not their fault
your ears hiss when you walk.
Correct. Spot on.
The OP is so dense that he couldn't pour warm piss out of a boot
if the instructions were written on the heel.
What chaps my ass, is that he's using free software, and comes here
DEMANDING free support and gets surly when he doesn't get the
answer he wants to hear. Very arrogant tone.
He can take a moment of all his free time and go fuck himself.
Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jul 2024 08:13:58 +0100, you wrote:
Tor always hides the client's IP address.
That's what I thought I had read years ago. I cannot find any
reference to this question these days. It disturbs me that you say
SEC3 is mistaken. That person KNOWS what they are talking >about...confusing.
I joined the Tor forum to get the question answered by some 'expert'.
That web site is horrible concoction of everything some jackass
techie thought he had to put into one page. It is a MESS. If I get an >answer to the question, I'll post it here - if I get an answer. From
what I went through trying to sign up and then post, I have little
hope for that site. I can't believe what a mess it is. (Don't bother >telling me how great and informative it is. I ain't going to answer
any trolls.)
There are tons of videos on YouTube explaining the Tor network's onion routing.
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